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A recent trend in behavioral research is the systema­
tic and empirical analysis of conflict behavior both 
within and among nations. External conflict behavior 
among nations can take many forms such as wars, 
embargoes, interruptions in diplomatic relations, and 
other behaviors that are indicative of aggression be­
tween national political systems. On the other hand, 
internal conflict within nations consists of such ev­
ents as riots, demonstrations, coups d’état, guerrilla 
warfare, and others denoting the relative instability 
of the political system. The larger theoretical ques­
tion that we want answered is: What causes these in­
ternal upheavals? According to Harry Eckstein, 
these internal upheavals run the spectrum of particu­
lar conditions within the economic, social, and polit­
ical spheres of a political system.1 In particular, the 
focus of this study and its purpose is to examine 
these variables in Greece during the 1963-1967 pe­
riod and hopefully to answer the following empirical 
questions:
1) Was there a widespread lack of popular sup­
port for the multiplicity of governments during 
this period?
2) A companion question is: Was the ephemeral 
character of these governments effective in 
satisfying economic demands of the populace?
3) Did the pervalence of riots and strikes affect 
the legitimacy of parliamentary government?
Fundamental to this analysis is the recognition of 
a lack of harmony existing in the economic, political, 
and social spheres of a political system which Chal­
mers Johnson indicates prevail in a disequilibrated 
system.2 This latter term he derives from the struc­
tural-functional equilibrium model of the sociolo­
gist. But in examining these variables Johnson has­
tens to point out that the «final cause of a revolutio­
nary resort to arms is some event, called an «accel­
erator», that holds forth the promise to the revolu­
tionaries that they can break the elite’s monopoly
1. For additional information and theories regarding con­
flict behavior within political systems see: James C. Davies, 
«Toward a Theory of Revolution», * American Sociological Re­
view, February, 1962; Harry Eckstein, «The Evaluation of Po­
litical Performance: Problems and Dimensions», Comparative 
Politics Series, Series Number: 01-018 ; Ivo Feierabend and 
Rosaline Feierabend, «Aggressive Behavior Within Politics, 
1948-1962: A Cross-National Study», The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1966; Ted R. Gurr and M. McClelland, «Political 
Performance: A Twelve-Nation Study», Comparative Politics 
Series, Series Number : 01-018 ; Terry Nardin, «Violence and 
the State: A Critique of Empirical Political Theory», Compara­
tive Politics Series, Series Number: 01-020; Martin C. Needier, 
«Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin Amer­
ica», American Political Science Review, September, 1966; 
Raymond Tanta and Manus Midlarsky, «A Theory of Revolu­
tion», The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Sepxember, 1967.
2. Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston : Lit­
tle, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 152.
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FIG. 1. Relationship between Rate of Achievement, Aspirations, and Expectations
A THEORY OF REVOLUTION
of power».1 What Johnson is implying is that there 
are specific situations or events that are favorable or 
provide the opportunity for intervention by an elite 
(military or political) for the implementation of a 
revolution.2 What, then, were the conditions in Greece 
during the 1963-1967 period that enhanced the mil­
itary success of the Revolution of April 21st, 1967?3
economic conditions
In examining the economic variables, we will uti­
lize some theories of revolution, in particular James 
Davies’ economic model which introduces us to the 
concept of «need satisfaction».4
Davies’ hypothesizes that revolutions or coups 
d’ètat are more likely to come about when a prolonged 
period of growth in economic and social develop­
ment is followed by a short-term phase of economic 
stagnation or decline. The result of this «J-curve», 
as he calls it, is that the soaring expectations in the 
minds of the populace created by such economic 
growth usually go beyond the actual material satis­
faction of the needs.5 Thus, a successful coup 
d'état or revolution is the work of neither the destitute 
nor the well satisfied, but of those whose actual
!. Ibid., p. 153.
2. See S. E. Finer, Man on Horseback for a further explana­
tion on his concept of opportunity for intervention, pp. 72-83.
3. The author will make no attempt to define or distinguish 
between a revolution or a coup d’état. It is, however, suggested 
that a military elite could conceivably institute a. coup d’état 
which in turn could develop into a revolution, i.e. Egypt, 1952.
4. James Davies, «Toward a Theory of Revolution», Ameri­
can Sociological Review, February, 1962, pp. 5-19.
5. Ibid., p. 6.
situation in life is improving less rapidly than they 
expect.
On the other hand, we might advance the alternate 
hypothesis that when there is a prolonged period of 
economic decline in the need satisfactions of the po­
pulace, a frustrated elite may view this as an opportu­
nity to instigate a revolution or a coup d’état. Thus 
arises the necessity of investigating the Greek econo­
mic indices that measure economic prosperity or 
depression for the 1963-April 1967 period; i.e., 
gross national product, consumer price index, wages 
and employment figures, and balance budgets and 
balance of payments.
The economic picture in Greece during the period 
under investigation was an uncertain one at best, 
although in the latter part of 1966 confidence in the 
economy began to rise again slightly and a marked 
improvement in public finances made possible a sub­
stantial increase in public investment expenditures. 
For the four years immediately preceding April, 
1967, the rate of growth in the gross national product 
averaged 7.5 percent.6 This was primarily a result of 
expanding industrial production which increased by 
more than fifteen percent in total value during 1965 
and 1966, even though the agricultural sector was 
lagging behind.7 Between 1960 and 1964 consumer 
prices remained relatively stable, but in 1965 infla­
tionary pressures began to build up, causing rapid 
increases in the price of consumer goods. This rise 
during the course of 1965 and 1966 averaged about
6. An Economic Report on Greece (London : Lloyds Bank, 
Ltd., 1967), p. 4.
7. Ibid., p. 8.
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TABLE 1. Main Economic Trends, 1964-1968. Economic Growth and Imbalances
191. * l^i.5 \«)U.
Source: Greek Submission to OECD. OECD Economic Surveys, Greece, February, 1969.
six percent.1 The rise in the consumer price index 
(see tables 1 and 2) seemed to be mainly the result of 
measures taken by the government in the direction 
of increased public expenditures and was especially 
manifest in the areas of uneconomic agricultural sub­
sidies, rising incomes, and an unfavorable balance 
of payments. Wages during the years between 1964 
and 1967 showed an average increase of approxima­
tely 8.4 percent. Although the wage scale did indicate 
an increase, unemployment remained relatively high, 
expecially in the agricultural sector, on the average 
about five percent for the same period.2 So in es­
sence, from 1963 to 1967 the economic climate could 
not be said to be favorable, although in 1966 the eco-
1. OECD Economic Surveys Greece (Zurich, Switzerland: 
1967 and 1969).
2. Ibid., pp. 13-20.
nomy slowly began to right itself. Thus there had 
been three years of worsening economy, followed by 
an improvement, precisely opposite to the pattern 
set by Davies’ «J-curve». So at first glance the Da­
vies’ hypothesis is not satisfied.
The second hypothesis that follows from the first, 
that is, regarding the prolonged period of economic 
deterioration that might be interpreted by an elite as 
sufficient opportunity to instigate a revolution or 
coup d’état, is a much closer fit even though the 1966 
economic upturn in Greece is inconsistent. While 
there is this additional support for the hypothesis of 
economic decline, another conditioning variable 
needs to be introduced at this point.
It is not enough to merely examine these hard eco­
nomic indicators. We must carry our analysis one 
step further and examine how these economic vari­
ti
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TABLE 2. Price Indices, 1965-1968. Quarterly Averages
Source: Greek Submission to OECD. OECD Economic Surveys, Greece, 
February, 1969.
ables are linked to the masses. In order to do so, we 
will examine public opinion data for the period of 
1964 to 1967. An investigation of such data might 
provide us with some clues regarding the expecta­
tions of the populace and, in turn, how this might 
have been perceived by the Greek officer corps.
In Table 3 it is clear that those surveyed in the 
year 1966 were quite negative about their prospects 
for a higher standard of living. This correlates with 
the problem of inflation that Greece was suffering 
during that year. Prior to that time, and subsequently 
in 1967 and 1968, the outlook of those surveyed was 
surprisingly optimistic regarding the same standard 
of living issue. More particularistic data concerning 
the economic outlook and how it affected individuals 
is offered in Tables 4 and 5. Judging from this data, 
the respondents appear to fall into the pessimi­
stic category for the period of 1966 to 1967; appar­
ently anticipating a year of rising prices, industrial 
disputes, an increase in taxes and economic diffi­
culties—all this, even though the employment picture 
was somewhat improved—all of which substantiates 
our earlier economic data.
Substantive information about the linkage between 
economic dysequilibrium and a revolution or coup 
d'état is still somewhat remote, but we can arrive at 
some tentative conclusions regarding economic data
vis-à-vis the attitude of the populace about their eco­
nomic future. As Martin Needier points out, «The 
overthrow of a government is more likely to occur 
when economic conditions are deteriorating».1 This, 
however, was not true in the case of Greece. Tensions 
and frustrations were evident from our data and we 
might infer that apprehension was the prevailing 
mood of the Greek citizenry. Although our econo­
mic data indicates a direction of economic stability 
in 1966, this positive effect is not translated in our 
public opinion data. A gap exists between the econo­
mic indicators and their correlating effect upon the 
man in the street. In 1966 and 1967 a time-lag effect 
was apparent in that the populace was still economi­
cally depressed. One important conclusion of this 
case study for empirical theory is the gap between 
objective economic statistics and the subjective per­
ceptions of the population. The greatest care should 
be utilized in studying economic data as a means of 
testing these empirical propositions. The economic 
causes for the implementation of a revolution or coup 
d’état are generally related to the satisfaction of the 
general public, not the actual health of the economy.
1. Martin C. Needier, «Political Development and Military 
Intervention in Latin America», American Political Science 
Review, September, 1966, p. 624.
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TABLE 3. Greek Populace Outlook Toward Standard of 
Living, 1964-1968*
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Going up 36% 36% 15% 47% 56%
going down 30% 18% 67% 17% 12%
Same 33% 40% 13% 29% 25%
Don’t know 1% 6% 5% 7% 7%
Sample size 400 800 400 400 800
Sources : Social Surveys Limited, London, England.
*Text of Question : Speaking generally, would you say that your standard 
of living (things you can buy and do) is going up, going 
down, or remaining the same?
TABLE 4. Future Outlook in the Social and Economic 
Spheres, 1965-1969*
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
A year of rising prices 58 % 74% 59% 23% 24%
A year of falling prices 6% 7% 5% 29% 22%
No opinion 36% 14% 36% 48% 54%
A year of full employment 38% 41% 31% 48% 67%
A year of rising unemploy-
ment 19% 32% 30% 11% 6%
No opinion 43% 27% 39% 41% 27%
A vear of strikes and in-
dustrial disputes 19% 39% 37% 4% 3%
A year of industrial peace 31% 28% 21% 72% 85%
No opinion 50% 33% 42% 24% 12%
A year when taxes will rise 29% 84% 54% 14% 18%
A year when taxes will fall 21% 4% 8% 32% 23%
No opinion 50% 12% 38% 54% 59%
A year of economic prospe-
rity 25% 11% 14% 50% 65%
A year of economic difficulty 33% 68% 46% 12% 9%
No opinion 42% 21% 40% 38% 26%
Sources : Social Surveys Limited, London, England.
♦Text of Question : Which of these do you think is likely to be true for (year)?
These surveys were conducted in December of the pre­
vious year. With the exception of 1965, the sample size 
was 400; for 1965 it was 800.
TABLE 5. Future Outlook Toward a Better orW orse Year*
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Better 59% 25% 23% 62% 60% 67%
Worse 16% 37% 40% 6% 6% 3%
Same 8 °/o 17% 7% 12% 13% 26%
Don’t know 17% 21% 30% 20% 21% 4%
Sample size 400 800 400 400 400 400
Sources : Social Surveys Limited, London, England.
♦Text of Question : So far as you are concerned do you think that (year) will 
be better or worse than (year)?
They may or may not be related and, as this cast study 
indicates, there may be a significant time-lag in 
the accuracy of popular attitudes. Analysts should 
therefore remember that hard data are at best indi­
rect indices of attitudes and should be cautiously 
used and interpreted.
There is a further causal step required for the link 
between deteriorating economic conditions, or, more 
accurately, popular perceptions of deteriorating 
economic conditions, and actual factors leading to 
intervention. If it is a factor creating a favorable op­
portunity, then the revolutionary leaders must per­
ceive it as such. So surely, if the state of the Greek 
economy had been a factor seen as creating an op­
portunity for intervention, the military leaders would 
certainly have used it in their rationale and stated 
public positions. This, however, was not the case. In 
none of their immediate post-April 21st pronounce­
ments or in the interviews that this writer conduct­
ed with varied officials of the government were the 
economic conditions in Greece during the period of 
1963 to 1967 ever mentioned as reasons for their in­
tervention, although the government did place major 
emphasis on the economy after it took over.
On the other hand, economic conditions can have 
a direct impact on revolutionaries, thereby creating 
a favorable condition for intervention. The Greek 
officer corps probably knew of the economic data 
discussed above, and would have seen the up-turn, 
but other figures must be taken into account if this 
be the case. In a revolutionary situation which is fun­
damentally concerned with a rather small group of 
politically active individuals, the issues of budget and 
balance of trade may greatly affect elite mood. 
Perhaps this is because government deficits and a 
decline in the balance of trade so gravely affect the 
opportunities for career advancement and overall 
prosperity of elites. Thus, although these two indi­
cators may not directly affect the general public ini­
tially, they are closely related to the perceptions of 
would-be elites, who are the prime movers of revo­
lutions or coups d’état. In other words, they may serve 
as a motive, as well as affecting perceptions of the 
«accelerator» for intervention. By utilizing the 
balance of trade and budget figures as economic indi­
ces in relation to the frame of mind of highly politi­
cized individuals, we might expect to find that the 
trend in the balance of trade and balance of budget 
would drop sharply prior to April 1967 (see Table 6).
We should expect to find some correlation 
between the decline in the balances of trade and the 
balances of budget and, in this case, military interven­
tion. Such was not the case. A partial explanation 
might be that the Greek armed forces were basically 
dependent on the United States to supply them with
6
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TABLE 6. Imports, Exports, Balances of Trade and Bal­
ances of Budget (In Millions of Drachmai)
Year Balance of 
Budget
Exports Imports Balance of 
Trade
1964 + 1.2 9,256 26,556 —17,296
1965 —0.4 9.833 34,012 —24,179
1966 +2.1 12,179 36,685 —24,506
1967 +0.3 14,856 35,588 —20,732
Source : «Statistical Yearbook of Greece» (Athens, Greece: National Statis­
tical Service, 1969).
the latest arms and equipment. The estimated value 
of the anticipated military arms for 1967 was $ 
44,000,0007 So it would seem that any imbalance in 
trade and budgets certainly did not threaten to imme­
diately disturb the normal functioning and operation 
of the Greek armed forces.
As we have indicated earlier, inflation was a dis­
turbing and vexing problem during the 1963-1967 pe­
riod. It was not, however, severe to the point of crea­
ting economic failure. The balance of payments pic­
ture was surely negative in that imports at that time 
were two and a half times as high as exports, but the 
overall economic picture was sufficiently stable so as 
to rule out the state of the economy as a precipitant 
of the revolution.
In summary, we must conclude that the economic 
evidence presented does not allow us to conclude that 
the economic factors were involved either in creating 
opportunity or the «accelerator» for intervention. 
The Davies model is directly disconfirmed in our 
analysis of the April 21st Revolution, while the theo­
ry of general economic deterioration has positive 
support when its subjective form of popular support 
is considered. But before weighing the overall impor­
tance of economic factors, we must consider an­
other important set of factors said to be significant 
determinants for providing the favorable conditions 
for a revolution or coup d’état.
political and social conditions
Another dimension that may provide the oppor­
tunity for a revolution or coup d’état is the preva­
lence of riots and strikes and how they affect the legit­
imacy of parliamentary government.Strikes were pre­
valent to the point of being rampant in Greece from 
1965 to April of 1967 and, in fact, were anticipated 
by the populace (see Table 4). During this period 
about eighty percent of the trade unions went on 
strike at various times—an estimated 950 strikes took
1. Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts,
Department of Defense ; March, 1970.
place, or about twenty-four per month.1 2 It is fur­
ther estimated that of the above-numbered striked 
approximately sixty percent of them were either organ­
ized or inspired by Communist or Communist-front 
organizations. The principal organizations involved 
in these strikes were the General Confederation 
for Labor, the Lambrakis Movement, the United 
Democratic Left (EDA), and some members and 
followers of the Center Union Party (EK). All 
of these were more than willing to embark upon 
an extraparliamentary course of action. The Lambra- 
kists in particular were extremely active in the de­
monstrations and other assorted anti-governmental 
activities. In fact, summarily, all of these organiza­
tions had expressed an intolerance, at once, of the 
traditional right-wing politicians, parliamentary in­
stitutions, and the armed forces.
Not only were strikes prevalent, but during this 
same period rioting seemed to be the order of the 
day, resulting in many injuries and some loss of life. 
From 1965 to April of 1967 approximately 1,200 in­
dividuals were injured in such riots and fifteen lost 
their lives. Of those injured, 300 were gendarmes.3 
Since the government of Greece is so intimately in­
volved in its economy, strikes and disruptions of any 
kind can be disastrously interpreted. Threats of mi­
litary call-ups were rife and on several occasions the 
Army was alerted to quell the rioting. But the bulk 
of responsibility for putting down these disorders 
was left to the local gendarmerie.
In connection with the above societal conditions, 
the relative stability or instability of the parliamenta­
ry government was another central issue of the times. 
Six separate governments came to power during this 
time, averaging a new government about every five 
months. The six governments were: George Atha- 
nasiades-Novas, July 15, 1965; Elias Tsirimokos, 
August 24, 1965; Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Sep­
tember 25, 1965 and July 15, 1966; Ioannis Paraske- 
vopoulos, January 14, 1967; Panayiotis Kanellopou­
los, March 15, 1967. This instability, in itself, might 
have undermined the legitimacy of these governments, 
but their ineffectiveness was further compounded 
by the behaviour of the members of Parliament, who 
seemed unwilling to work within the framework of 
the institutional rules and procedures.lt was report­
ed in the press on numerous occasions that mem­
bers of Parliament actually threatened other fellow 
members with bodily harm and even scuffled and en­
gaged in «fisticuffs» on occasion.4 Such situations,
2. Diati Eginai H. Epanastasi lis 21 Apriliou 1967 (Athe- 
nai : Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 95. Also see The 
New York Times for the period of 1966 to April, 1967.
3. Ibid., p. 81.
4. Diati Eginai H. Epanastasi, op. cit.,pp. 48-49. Also see 
Parliamentary Session Papers for 1965-1966.
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although not directly linked to the ^question of 
governmental legitimacy, assuredly raised considera­
ble doubt as to the institutional viability of Parla­
ment as a body, and to the stability, both politically 
and mentally, of its members. I should hasten to 
point out that Parliament might well have reflected 
external tensions and still have remained viable if 
the conditions were different.
At no time during this chaotic period was martial 
law imposed, nor were the rights of assembly or pe­
tition denied or banned. As mentioned earlier, civil­
ian authorities did not seem overly dependent on the 
armed forces for the maintenance of peace and order, 
but the above configuration does indicate that the 
various governments were unable to resolve the myr­
iad conflicts through compromise and bargaining.
In contrast to economic factors, there were fre­
quent public announcements made by the military 
leaders to justify their intervention, in which they 
continually mentioned the social and political turmoil 
that existed during this period, especially from 1965 
to April of 1967. The instability qua instability of 
this period seems to have been the «accelerator» that 
Johnson mentions for intervention. That is to say, 
that the prevailing social and political conditions at 
that time provided the military leaders with the «fa­
vorable change to intervene». Ironically, however, 
according to a poll of the populace during 1965-1966, 
the majority of them (43 percent) felt that the most 
crucial problem facing Greece was economic in nat­
ure, while 27 percent of those polled felt that the po­
litical problems were more acute.1 Thus, in actuali­
ty, the negative economic expectations of the popula­
tion were an important, if not the most important, 
factor comprising the opportunity, but it would ap­
pear that it was not immediately perceived by the mil­
itary leaders. The success of this intervention might
1. Elpides Kai Fo vie gia tin Ellada, 1966 (Athens : Institu­
te of Anthropos, 1967), pp. 354-355.
have been shaped by economic factors, but the per­
ceived «accelerator» must ultimately be viewed 
through the eyes of the revolutionaries and, in this 
case, the Greek Military Officer Corps.
conclusions
This examination of the Revolution of April 21st, 
1967, in Greece has led us to two conclusions. First, 
although economic variables are factors to be consid­
ered in studying revolutions and coups d’état, in 
this particular case it would appear that they did not 
play a primary role, although the subjective percep­
tion of the populace regarding the economy does have 
positive support in our findings. Therefore, the writ­
er would suggest that more analysis is necessary and 
the linkages between objective and subjective vari­
ables' need to be more closely correlated in studying 
revolutionary behaviour. Second, this study is con­
sistent with other investigations that indicate that po­
litical instability, as a result of fragmentation of opi­
nions, can lead to hostile factions of such power that 
governments can be deprived of any coherent body 
of support strong enough to survive. This was espe­
cially true in Greece during the 1965-April 1967 pe­
riod. Therefore, this case study affirms the fact that 
political instability is a telling variable in signalling 
to an elite that a favorable condition exists to provide 
the opportunity for the implementation of a revolu­
tion or coup d’état.
Although this was an exploratory endeavor, these 
findings are sufficiently striking and pursuasive to 
argue from a broader empirical and theoretical per­
spective for studies utilizing a wider scope of vari­
ables: economic, political, sociological, and psycho­
logical—plus an inventory of others, complementary 
aggresive behaviors, and a longer time period. All of 
these should lead to more refined results in the study 
of internal conflicts of nations.
Therefore, the city-state is a perfectly natural form of association, as the earlier 
associations from which it sprang were natural. This association is the end-product 
of the perfecting process of any object, that we call its nature, that which man, house, 
household, or anything else aims at being. Moreover, the aim and end can only be that 
which is best, perfection; and self-sufficiency is both end and perfection. It follows that 
the state belongs to a class of objects which exist in nature, and that man is by nature 
a political animal; it is his nature to live in a state. He who by his nature and not simply 
by ill-luck has no city, no state, is either too bad or too good, either sub-human or super­
human... But... man is a political animal in a sense in which a bee is not, or any grega­
rious animal. Nature, as we say, does nothing without some purpose; and for the pur­
pose of making man a political animal she has endowed him alone among the animals 
with the power of reasoned speech.
Aristotle, «Politics», Book I, Chapter 2 (Penguin Classics).
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